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The ever-increasing scholarship on the politics of human rights focuses on either international 
treaty negotiations or domestic politics after ratification. It thus misses how the stage of 
implementation is often crucially set in the period between signing and ratifying. This article 
addresses this lacuna via an in-depth discussion of the ratification process of the Disability 
Convention (CRPD) in the Netherlands. In this period, stakeholders highlight certain treaty 
obligations, while downplaying or ignoring others. This theory of preratification politics calls 
for more differentiation between treaty obligations and attention to the politics of their 
mobilization, even in the most monist countries.  
I. Introduction 
The 2016 Hansard of the Netherlands shows one remarkable insertion. Its rendition of the 
parliamentary debate on the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), in italics, indicates that, at some point during the debate, instead of 
applause, some dog barking took place.1 This is not only an indication of the fact that during the 
discussion, for the first time, assistance dogs had been allowed to enter the public gallery; it also 
serves to illustrate how one specific aspect of the treaty objectives—accessibility for those reliant 
on assistance dogs—became highlighted in the Dutch parliamentary debate, whereas other 
elements of the Treaty were downplayed or downright ignored in the nine years it took the Dutch 
to ratify the CRPD.2 
What happened in these nine years, and what happens more generally in the period 
between States signing and ratifying treaties, deserves further scrutiny than has been awarded by 
scholars to date. The past decades have led to an explosion of literature on how international 
human rights acquire meaning in a given local context, whether under the heading of 
“enforcement,” “mobilization,” “compliance,” “effectiveness,” “socialization,” or elsewise.3 The 
bulk of this literature, however, considers either what happens during international treaty 
negotiations or after ratification.4 This is a significant omission. Preratification politics can, 
theoretically, have a crucial impact on the way in which human rights treaties, and their specific 
provisions, are understood, mobilized, enforced and—ultimately—acquire meaning in a given 
setting. The average three years and ten months it takes those countries who do ratify a human 
rights treaty to do so often constitutes a period of intense domestic negotiations. In this time, the 
treaty obligations agreed upon internationally are introduced into the domestic setting, with key 
actors like those within the state, but also NGOs, political parties, the media, academia, and 
interested individuals seeking to highlight, downplay, or simply ignore certain treaty obligations 
before the human rights treaty moves to the phase of actual enforcement.5 
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Academic attention for preratification politics seems all the more important where it 
concerns special human rights treaties. Such treaties often do not create new rights, but serve to 
raise awareness and further institutionalize the preexisting rights of particular groups, like 
women (CEDAW), migrant workers (ICMW), and children (CRC). Their essential purpose is 
thus political: reemphasizing the fact that the group concerned and the individuals involved also 
have human rights, and ensuring that these rights are respected. Special treaties, arguably more 
than others, “reflect politics but . . . also shape political behavior, setting the stage for new 
political alliances, empowering new political actors, and heightening public scrutiny.”6 Frédéric 
Mégret, for instance, after a thoughtful analysis of the rationale for a special treaty like the 
CRPD, concludes that “[t]he Convention is testimony to the significant need for specific human 
rights instruments when it comes to certain categories of humanity whose condition has made 
them uniquely vulnerable to human rights violations and who are insufficiently protected by the 
existing, mainstream vocabulary of rights.”7 As the fourth UN Convention to address a particular 
group, the CRPD is also interesting because it incorporates many recent insights on what 
constitutes effective mechanisms of treaty implementation.8  
Against this background, this article seeks to analyze and theorize preratification politics 
based on a case study of the processes between the Dutch signing of the CRPD and its 
ratification, in order to further our understanding of how human rights acquire meaning in a 
given setting. What were the politics surrounding the process towards CRPD ratification in the 
Netherlands, and what do these teach us about the politics of this particular phase of human 
rights implementation in general? These questions are answered based on an analysis of the 
relevant legal, policy, and media documentation, including the social media that are so important 
in human rights activism these days, analyzed via the qualitative data-analysis software Nvivo 
based on a grounded theory approach.9 In addition, interviews with key stakeholders took place, 
as well as a digital focus group discussion and research survey amongst the population at large 
and those most directly affected by the objectives of the Disability Convention. 
The basis for a theory of preratification politics is formed via an overview of recent 
literature on the politics of human rights implementation and the actors and processes involved in 
it. Subsequently, this article discusses the objectives of the CRPD, its inbuilt conceptions on 
treaty implementation, and the general way in which the Netherlands related to the CRPD before 
and after signing the treaty in 2007. The Dutch instance shows how key actors have three post 
signature approaches specific to treaty obligations: highlighting, downplaying, or simply 
ignoring them. . A discussion of these three strategies, on the basis of specific examples, leads to 
a conclusion on the wider implications of the case of the Disability Convention and the Dutch. In 
addition, this article offers research on how the period before ratification of key human rights 
treaties sets the stage for their implementation and demonstrates the importance of scholarly 
attention for these processes.. 
 
II. The Politics of Human Rights Implementation 
The way in which human rights treaties acquire meaning in a given national or local setting has 
become subject to a great deal of socio-scientific research over the past decades. As Gregory 
Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg argued, “[t]he theoretical debate over whether international law 
matters is a stale one. What matters now is the study of the conditions under which international 
law is formed and has effects.”10 Here, political scientists have sunk their teeth into the reasons 
for state compliance with human rights treaties, the variables that account for it, and the 
mechanisms by which it takes place. One key division is between rationalist approaches—that 
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focus on the trade-off that states see between compliance and non-compliance—and the more 
constructivist approaches—that emphasize the way in which various actors, their interests, and 
normative power shape both international and national processes of treaty compliance.11 Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks, for instance, argue that next to material inducement and persuasion, 
processes of acculturation lead to treaty compliance.12  
One common denominator in this literature is the importance granted to specific actors in 
treaty implementation. Without a domestic constituency committed towards mobilizing the treaty 
obligations, little happens.13 Human rights, as Beth Simmons put it, “are highly contingent on the 
nature of domestic demands, institutions, and capacities.”14 In the early days of political science 
research on the topic, Thomas Risse set out how the interplay between local and international 
NGOs can pressure governments into compliance with human rights obligations.15 These days, 
however, one must take into account the multi-layered nature of formal human rights obligations. 
Human rights are increasingly defined and given meaning at the regional level, for instance, in 
the context of Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights, and in that of the 
European Union. Similarly, municipalities and regions also increasingly claim a formal role in 
human rights implementation, for instance, via adopting an identity as human rights cities.16 This 
interplay between the international, regional, national, and local levels leads to a constitutional 
pluralism in the formal legal sense and different interpretations of the normative content of 
specific rights are mobilized and influence each other.17 
Concerning non-state actors, there is a widespread consensus on the key role of NGOs in 
both bringing about human rights treaties and mobilizing them domestically. NGOs are the most 
important enforcement mechanisms in the field of human rights, pressuring states towards treaty 
formulation, ratification, reporting, and ultimately compliance.18 Here, the differences between 
NGOs should be noted: some are better funded and more vocal than others, thus ensuring more 
attention for their issues of concern.19 Research also shows the role of businesses, churches, 
other organizations, and differing political parties in domestic processes of treaty 
implementation.20 Of course, the judiciary plays a key role in forcing governments to comply 
with treaty obligations—initially in specific situations, but often with much wider impact.21 
Likewise, media attention plays an important role in drawing attention to the treaty obligations 
and their consequences. Increasingly, international monitoring mechanisms play a role in 
enhancing domestic implementation.22 Less scholarly attention is paid to the role of individuals, 
even if there is ample evidence of the impact that one person, who subsequently mobilizes other 
actors, can have.23 
The mechanisms of human rights implementation have been defined as the “meso-level 
processes and their constitutive elements that can produce (or prevent) social transformation.”24 
Classical legal mechanisms are legislative enactment, policy measures, judicial enforcement, and 
the exertion of soft power via treaty monitoring bodies—by means of treaty reporting and 
individual communications.25 Social science scholars show the potential impact of these 
mechanisms is closely related to the relationship that they have wider political processes. The 
impact human rights litigation has, for instance, is heightened by NGO pressure, just like the 
Concluding Observations of treaty bodies have more effect when they are mobilized by civil 
society and referred to in the media. .26 Other key mechanisms are awareness of treaty 
obligations amongst key stakeholders and the media: “treaties need a strong domestic 
constituency to have local impact.”27 Over the past decade, additionally, more and more attention 
has been paid to the disciplinary effects of developing human rights indicators, measuring, and 
monitoring them.28 In all cases, it is clear that the more human rights treaties are in line with 
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domestic concerns and processes, the higher the chances of having an impact.  
This all, of course, concerns the national level. In attempting to better understand how 
treaty obligations impact individual lives, and how these processes of localization take place, one 
must adopt a user’s perspective and investigate the processes by which specific rights travel to, 
and are mobilized by, a given setting.29 Such a setting, often referred to as a “semi-autonomous 
social field,” can be a school, a health care institution, a village, or a particular community in 
which individuals and key stakeholders might mobilize human rights law to further specific 
social goals, align such law with existing cultures and beliefs, or opt to let other norms prevail.30 
Mobilizing human rights in a particular local context is a patchy process in which actors and the 
information they have play a key role. Sally Engle Merry has labelled the process by which 
universal norms are translated to be in line with local cultural beliefs, religion, and traditions that 
of ‘vernacularization’, and has pointed at the key role of ‘translators’ in these processes.31 In all, 
it is clear that “universal principles, when applied to particular contexts, inevitably take on 
different forms. This happens within manifold constellations of power,” in which global, 
national, and local contexts are mutually constitutive and norms are negotiated cross-culturally.32 
Even if the combined insights from political science, sociology, and anthropology have 
substantially heightened our insight into the processes of treaty enforcement, these insights are 
often general, and pay little attention to, for example, the degree to which some treaty provisions 
are mobilized where others remain dormant. Similarly, little attention is paid to the temporal 
dimension of treaty implementation: how a treaty provision largely ignored at one point in time, 
can be mobilized and acquire meaning in another political dispensation. 
One particularly surprising lacuna in the social science literature on treaty 
implementation concerns the period between signing and ratifying human rights treaties.33 Most 
literature either focuses on the international negotiations pertaining to a treaty or takes the 
moment of ratification as a point of departure. Ratification, here, is an international act, 
conducted at the international plane, as is signing a treaty.34 In the most important scholarship on 
the relationship between the international and domestic processes of treaty negotiation, Robert 
Putnam conceives of these processes as a “two-level game” in which negotiators must 
simultaneously ensure that an identical agreement is supported on both sides, which can have 
very different interests.35 More recently, a number of scholars have criticized this work for 
failing to take into account the sequential character of these processes.36 Jeffery Lantis, for 
instance, sets out the conditions for ratification in the “post-commitment phase,” like the 
executive strategies involved, the type of electoral system, interest group pressure, and public 
support.37 Carlos Costa adds the importance of transnational processes, with actors studying and 
anticipating what key actors in other countries do.38 Even if such scholarship signals a marked 
lack of attention for the ratification phase; the way in which domestic treaty interpretation, and 
thus implementation, is foreshadowed by the legislative process hardly receives any attention. 
Thus, the period of ratification is the time in which the treaty is introduced into the 
domestic arena and in which (successive) governments and political parties take a position on 
different treaty provisions. In addition, parliaments have their say on how they would like to see 
a treaty implemented and substantial lobbying pertaining to a treaty takes place.  Of course, 
marked differences exist between monist systems (in which international law is considered to be 
a part of national law) and dualist systems (in which international law requires translation into 
national law) in the legislative enactment of a treaty.39 Nevertheless, the political processes often 
do not differ significantly because, often, treaties will require amendments to be made to existing 
legislation or introduction of new legislation in either type of government system. .40 The 
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literature that exists on the period between signing and ratifying treaties focuses largely on the 
legal obligations in the preratification period, as set out in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, 
setting out how countries, once they have signed, cannot defeat the object and the purpose of a 
treaty.41 The importance of a focus on preratification politics, in contrast, is illustrated by the 
amount of time that it takes countries worldwide to ratify a treaty. For countries that end up 
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The purpose of this article is to develop a theory on the politics involved in the 
preratification phase of human rights treaties grounded in one particular case study: the 
ratification of the CRPD in the Netherlands. The Netherlands forms a particularly interesting 
country in this regard. It is a monist country, in which international human rights treaties, once 
ratified by means of publication in the Government Gazette, automatically become part of Dutch 
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law and can grant subjective rights to individuals in the Netherlands.42 Given the consequences, 
treaty ratification generally takes a long time in the Netherlands—six years on average for all 
treaties other than the CRPD in contrast to the global average of three years and ten months. The 
country also often prides itself upon first ensuring full treaty compliance before ratification takes 
place.43 With the CRPD, the Netherlands took nine years and three months before ratification, as 
opposed to a global average of two years and seven months.44 In this period, the Netherlands had 
three different coalition governments: one under the leadership of the Christian Democrat Jan-
Peter Balkenende and two under the leadership of the Liberal Democrat Mark Rutte. Just as the 
Netherlands is an interesting case study to serve as a basis for formulation of theories on 
preratification politics, so is the CRPD a relevant treaty to consider. As with other specialist 
treaties, it might seek to bring about a paradigm change, but does not necessarily involve the 
introduction of new rights.45 The drawing up of a specialist treaty is thus about the politics of 
mobilization—internationally, nationally, and locally—and about explaining that human rights 
also apply to a particular vulnerable group—be it women (CEDAW), children (CRC), or migrant 
workers (CMW). With this in mind, let us turn towards an introduction of the CRPD and the 
particulars of its implementation in the Netherlands.  
 
III. The Disability Convention and the Dutch 
The United Nations Adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 13 
December 2006, together with its Optional Protocol, reportedly after the swiftest negotiations 
ever.46 It is heralded for strengthening the plight of the world’s largest minority, an often-
discriminated group, and for bringing “those in darkness into light.”47 Upon the adoption of the 
Convention, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights noted how the adoption “enshrines a 
‘paradigm shift’ in attitudes that moves from a view of persons with disabilities as objects of 
charity, medical treatment and social protection to subjects of rights, able to claim those rights as 
active members of society.”48 This rights-based understanding, which sees people living with 
disabilities as citizens, is apparent in the guiding principles of the Convention: autonomy, non-
discrimination, inclusion, respect for difference, equality of opportunity, accessibility, equality of 
men and women, and respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities. The 
Convention covers a very wide array of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights, thus 
reiterating most of the rights included in the UN Bill of Rights and stipulating their applicability 
to people living with disabilities. 
One striking aspect of the CRPD was thus the—relative—speed of the negotiations 
involved and of the adoption of the treaty. A Committee of Experts on the Disabled might have 
recommended an international Convention in 1987, but the formal negotiations only started—
upon the initiative of Mexico—in 2001, making it only five years for the formulation and 
adopted of the Convention. One special element in the negotiations was the strong participation 
of people with disabilities and their representative organizations in the process. The Ad Hoc 
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect 
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, established in 2001, contained 40 country 
representatives and 400 representatives of NGOs and DPOs.49 For the first time, not only were 
ECOSOC-accredited groups allowed to participate, but also those without such accreditation, 
making for “totally unprecedented” participation.50  
It is not only the degree of NGO-participation that illustrates the extent to which the 
CRPD is truly the first twenty-first century human rights treaty. The Disability Convention is 
distinctly modern because of how it incorporates recent insights on both the causes of human 
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rights violations and ways of combating them. . It recognizes, for instance, the degree to which a 
disability is a social construction, stating in the preamble that “disability is an evolving concept 
and that disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal 
and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others.”51 Lisa Waddington comments how the CRPD, in reflecting “the reality 
that disability stems primarily from the failure of the social environment to meet the needs and 
aspirations of people with impairments . . . is the highest legal manifestation and confirmation of 
the social model of disability on the international stage.”52 It also focuses on the intersectionality 
of rights violations, with specific provisions setting out the rights of women and children, 
specifying, for instance, that “women and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple 
discrimination” and stipulating the need to take into account the “best interests” of the child in all 
actions involving children with disabilities.53 
Where it concerns specific provisions to ensure optimal implementation of the 
Convention, the CRPD gives explicit attention to actors other than the nation state. As said, this 
is the first UN Convention ratified by the European Union, which was closely involved in the 
negotiation of the Convention.54 The CRPD also brings innovation in the field of monitoring—
that has surged to the fore in human rights interpretation discussions: it sets up its own 
monitoring body, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but also explicitly 
regulates the relationship with the specialized agencies and other UN organs, calling for 
consistency in their suggestions, guidelines, and recommendations. It also contains the “most 
complete provision on national level implementation and monitoring ever in an international 
human rights treaty.” 55 This is because it calls for the appointment of a national monitoring 
body, including the option of a coordination point and subnational monitoring bodies and 
because it calls for the establishment or strengthening of monitoring mechanisms..  
The Dutch government, by its own admission, was initially not in favor of a specialist 
treaty, and thus another human rights Convention—it felt that persons with disabilities already 
had enough protection under the existing UN Treaties.5657 It was only when it became clear that 
adoption of the Convention was inevitable that the Netherlands actively joined the negotiation 
process, trying to ensure that the treaty would not contain any new rights. Once the Convention 
was adopted, the Netherlands was amongst the first of eighty-one countries to sign it on the 30 
March 2007, be it with six interpretative declarations.58 It is striking that the press attention to the 
signature, and the parliamentary discussions at the time, focused largely on the foreign policy 
implications of the Convention.59 This is in line with a wider Dutch tendency towards “human 
rights exportism”: considering human rights to—above all—be a foreign policy objective, which 
is only slowly starting to change.60 In spite of the rapid signature, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
warned the Parliament in 2008 that it could take a long time for the Netherlands to ratify the 
Convention, as research concerning implementing legislation would have to take place first.61 
The cabinet at the time (consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Christian Union (CU) 
and the Social Democrats (PvdA)) that sat until 2010 did not undertake any action towards 
ratification, nor did the cabinet that followed (consisting of the Liberal Democrats (VVD) and 
the CDA) that only sat for two years, until 2012.62  
In 2012, five years after the Netherlands had signed the CRPD, the Governmental 
Agreement included the resolve to ratify the treaty, but with the ominous condition that “the 
duties related to it would be implemented gradually.”63 The only action before the time had been 
a parliamentary motion calling on the government to ratify and the commissioning of reports on 
the financial and legal consequences of ratification.64 A 2011 civil society position paper states 
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that the Dutch reticence towards ratification was due to a combination of a fear of loss of 
sovereignty, opposition by employers, silence on the side of the unions, and general opposition 
within the biggest party, the VVD.65 In all, it was not until 2015 that the government put a bill 
concerning ratification to Parliament. The House of Representatives discussed this bill in 
December 2015 and January 2016, and agreed upon by the Senate in April, after which formal 
ratification took place in July 2016. It is possible that the process would have taken much longer 
without the persistent pressure from civil society and from “above” and “below.” Civil society, 
for instance, was united in the Coalition for Inclusion that, for the first time in history, brought 
together a wide variety of organizations that organized conferences on “Making the UN Treaty 
Happen” (VN Verdrag waarmaken) and set up a website and a social media campaign on the 
topic, and was part of the wider umbrella organization “All(in)” (Ieder(in)). Part of the pressure 
on the Dutch government also came from the European Union that had already ratified the 
Convention in 2010.66 Additionally, a number of Dutch municipalities symbolically ratified the 
Convention and began to implement it, thus exerting bottom-up pressure on the process.67  
 
IV. A Typology of Preratification Politics 
In their seminal work, Closing the Rights Gap: From Human Rights to Social Transformation, 
LaDawn Haglund and Robin Stryker set out not only the mechanisms, but also the actors and 
pathways that interplay in realizing social transformation by means of human rights. The 
preratification period, as such, could be considered a mechanism of implementation in itself, 
geared towards renegotiating the implications of the treaty in the domestic context. This 
important phase sets the stage for the impact that a treaty may have, far away from the 
international arena and firmly planted into the domestic context, with all the interests at play.  
Even if the formal steps in this preratification period depend on the national context, the 
Dutch case can serve as an example of how the formal moments in the legislative process also 
enable political influencing.68 These steps include the following: the government, in the case of a 
treaty, prepares a bill containing the initiative to ratify the treaty. Before this, it consults with 
citizens and other organizations, and can ask for external advice. In the case of the CRPD, for 
example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment asked first the Human Rights Research 
Centre SIM and then the Rotterdam School of Economics to prepare a report on the legal and 
financial consequences of ratification in 2012 and 2013.69 Subsequently, the government asks the 
Advisory Division of the Council of State for its advice. It is only then that the Bill proposing 
ratification, with an extensive Memorandum of Explanation, is given to the House of 
Representatives. It can be accompanied with proposals to adopt existing legislation, as was the 
case here with the Electoral Code and the Equal Treatment Act pertaining to Disabilities and 
Chronic Illnesses.70 The responsible parliamentary committee first discusses the Bill, after which 
the government prepares a further Explanatory Memorandum. It is only then that it is tabled for a 
plenary session in Parliament, in this case in late 2015, early 2016. During the plenary 
discussion, the House of Representatives—which has the right of amendment—can call attention 
to certain features, or put certain demands to government, via parliamentary motions. Once 
Parliament has adopted the Bill, it goes to the Senate, which formally has more of a revising role 
and cannot ask for amendments, even if it can table motions. If the Senate adopts a Bill, as was 
the case with the CRPD, it acquires the force of law upon publication in the Government 
Gazette. In the case of the CRPD this took place on the 14 April 2016.71 Formal ratification, as 
an international act, took place on the 14 June 2016, after which implementation still had to start. 
Within this whole process, stakeholders can interpret treaty provisions at many different 
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moments. This is important, as one consequence of the multilateral UN negotiations is that the 
provisions are generally very vague and open to multiple interpretations.72 The stakeholders 
include, first of all, the government itself. In addition, with an all-encompassing treaty like the 
CRPD, stakeholders included employers, businesses, the education sector, the transport and 
hospitality sector, insurance companies, and a wide variety of non-governmental organizations. 
These stakeholders are not a homogeneous block. Within government, for instance, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs would, behind the screens, emphasize the advantages of treaty ratification for 
the international position of the Netherlands, whereas the Ministry of Economic Affairs, or 
Social Affairs and Employability had concerns about the financial consequences of treaty 
ratification. In addition, there are political and even personal divides that determine 
governmental and parliamentary positions—in this process, for instance, the PvdA very much 
took the lead whereas the VVD showed much more reticence. A PvdA parliamentarian in a 
wheelchair, Otwin van Dijk, was recognized by many as the driving force behind treaty 
ratification, and recounted during the parliamentary debate how, when he first entered 
Parliament, the doors were still too heavy to be opened by someone in a wheelchair.73  
A key driving force behind the legislative process, however, was civil society, which also 
consisted of a myriad of interests, ranging from the Deaf Society to the Foundation for 
Hyperventilation and the Association on Automutilation. Many of these civil society 
organizations started cooperating for the first time as a result of the impending treaty ratification 
and went through the process of reframing their particular concern as a human rights concern, in 
which the cooperation between organizations strengthened the effectiveness of their lobby. This 
lobby took place via background reports, thematic meetings, letters to, and discussions with, 
individual parliamentarians, and a clear presence at marking moments in the legislative process, 
as well as via the general media and a very active social media campaign. The hashtag 
#VNVerdrag (#UNTreaty) was combined with other tags to add particular emphasis, for instance 
#hulphonden (#assistancedogs), #pleeback (#toiletback) on toilets in trains, and #jekomternietin 
(#Youcantgetin), #wijstaanop (#Westandup), and #toegankelijkheid (#Accessibility) to 
emphasize the importance of accessibility in general.  
In analyzing the processes of interpretation and renegotiation that took place in the CRPD 
preratification phase, one can distinguish three distinct strategies followed by key stakeholders: 
highlighting, downplaying, or simply ignoring treaty obligations. Highlighting took place where 
the government, for instance via extensive attention in the Explanatory Memorandum, brought 
specific treaty obligations to the fore or when it was forced to do so at a later stage via 
parliamentary motions backed up by media pressure. On the other hand, the government also 
engaged in downplaying certain requirements via what one could call a preemptive minimization 
of treaty obligations. Treaty obligations were also simply be ignored in the sense that they were 
not explicitly elaborated upon by the government or picked up by parliamentarians and interested 
organizations. The following sections will provide a brief example of each process. 
 
A. Highlighting Treaty Obligations: The Example of Accessibility 
In the CRPD preratification period, by far the largest share of governmental, parliamentary, and 
public attention went to the issue of accessibility. Article 9(1) of the CRPD holds that: 
 
To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in 
all aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to 
persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical 
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environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including 
information and communications technologies and systems, and to other facilities 
and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas. 
These measures, which shall include the identification and elimination of 
obstacles and barriers to accessibility, shall apply to, inter alia: 
(a) Buildings, roads, transportation and other indoor and outdoor facilities, 
including schools, housing, medical facilities and workplaces; 
(b) Information, communications and other services, including electronic services 
and emergency services.74 
 
The extent of State Party obligations was further set out in the General Comment No. 2 of the 
CRPD Committee, which set out the precise state obligations in terms of the physical 
environment, transportation, information, communication, and services, stipulating how 
publically accessible buildings, no matter their ownership, should be accessible to all. It 
emphasized the duty to apply universal design to all new goods, products, facilities, 
technologies, and services. States parties, additionally, are required to take measures to ensure 
that private entities that offer facilities and services to the public consider all aspects of 
accessibility for persons with disabilities.75 The Committee also stipulated that the duty to 
implement accessibility is unconditional. The General Comment stipulated state obligations, 
such as gradually and systematically removing barriers and adopting, promulgating, and 
monitoring standards.  
The Dutch government, in its explanatory memorandum, already paid a great deal of 
attention to the general importance of accessibility. In particular the government stressed access 
to public spaces and to information, with a detailed overview of current practice and actions to 
take in the near future, often with direct reference to EU legislation.76 This focus was increased 
by an emphasis on the issue by NGOs consulted during the process and intensive social media 
activity under hashtags as #Jekomterniet in (#Youcantgetin) or #toegankelijkheid 
(#accessibility), pointing out striking examples of buildings, parks, trains, and libraries 
inaccessible to people with disabilities. The parliamentarian who was the driving force behind 
treaty ratification, Otwin van Dijk, indicated repeatedly how making accessibility the norm was 
the reason he entered Parliament. As a result, the importance of accessibility was highlighted in a 
number of motions and proposed amendments to legislation adopted in Parliament, on topics like 
a monitoring the role of the National Human Rights Institute on this topic, accessibility of 
buildings, accessibility of digital governmental information, and the removal of barriers for 
political participation (for instance in voting boots). Even if these are state obligations included 
in the CRPD, the motions served to highlight the importance of these aspects of accessibility for 
a parliamentary majority.77 
To a large extent, the government’s resistance to make accessibility a general principle 
triggered attention to this topic in parliamentary discussions. The State Secretary, clearly under 
the influence of the VVD party, took the position that the CRPD did not have any consequences 
for private parties. The law to give effect to the Convention (uitvoeringswet) would include an 
amendment to the Law on Equal Treatment on the Basis of Handicap or Chronic Disease 
(WGBH/CZ) concerning goods and services that would oblige parties to provide reasonable 
accommodation, not imposing a disproportionate burden, without reference to the other 
obligations set out in Article 9 of CRPD. The government’s examples included (1) someone who 
cannot walk well but has to climb two stairs to enter a hairdresser, can ask the hairdresser for 
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help, or for a plank to be put down; and (2) a person with a visual impairment can ask restaurant 
personnel to read out the menu.78 Parliamentarians felt that this did not go far enough in 
establishing a general norm: “Why would someone who is disabled have to beg for 
accommodation in a restaurant, public transport or a shop?.”79 They proposed an amendment 
stating that all parties addressed by this particular anti-discrimination law needed to take due care 
of general accessibility, unless this would be an unreasonable burden.  
This proposal nearly caused the Liberal Democrats to withdraw support for the CRPD. 
They  only reluctantly agreed after a provision was included stating that the actual obligations of 
the provision would be worked out in a governmental decree (amvb). The concept-decree, 
published in October 2016, reopened the discussion by stating that the obligations in the 
provision only concerned “simple adaptions” (voorzieningen van eenvoudige aard). It also stated 
that—in deciding what constituted an unreasonable burden—attention would be giventhe size of 
the organizations, the costs, the use, the life of the infrastructure concerned, the 
historic/cultural/architectural value of the object, and the safety and feasibility of the measures to 
be taken.80 The concept-decree included some examples of simple adaptations (“that can be 
brought about with little to no costs and effort”) like removing objects restraining wheelchairs in 
a shop, putting down background music when so requested by people with a hearing impairment, 
and “paying enough time and attention to people with a mental disability, for instance in 
explaining a good or a service.”81 The facts that the decree did not include a definition of 
accessibility, a timeframe, nor refer to the general norm or the CRPD, lead to furious civil 
society responses and tweets stating—in Dutch—that #Youcantgetin would now become 
#Youwillnevergetin.82 
Even though the issue of accessibility came to dominate the parliamentary proceedings, 
this does not mean the government intended to completely follow the CRPD in this regard. As 
the State Secretary wrote in response to a parliamentarian who asked whether the government 
intended to implement the treaty by the letter: “The treaty does not have direct effect. 
Implementing legislation ensures a translation towards the Dutch situation.”83 The final decree, 
passed in June 2017, did include a strong position of civil society and attention for the process of 
implementation, but still contained the watered-down provisions on ‘simple adaptations’ and the 
broad provisions allowing organizations to invoke ‘unreasonable burden’ as a reason to not 
implement measures.84 As is often the case in giving meaning to human rights treaties, the extent 
of the rights foreseen by the treaty actually granted in a given context only becomes apparent in 
the small print of administrative law. The discussion on accessibility does show, however, how 
some issues can become subject to vehement national renegotiation, finding their (watered 
down) way into national laws and policies, whereas others, as we will see, do not receive any 
attention. 
 
B. Downplaying Obligations: The Issue of Justiciability 
In the Netherlands, the CRPD’s consequences on accessibility were a main topic of debate from 
the very start—be it with notable differences in the interpretation. One might call the next 
strategy, mostly in the hands of the government, ‘preemptive minimization.’ or the simple 
downplaying of treaty obligations. Here, the justiciability of treaty provisions is a case in point. 
One important question pertaining to the CRPD is the degree to which the rights it contains allow 
individuals to claim them before a court. The fact that the CRPD comes with an Optional 
Protocol that allows individuals to complain about infringements of the Convention is, in itself, 
an indication of the fact that the document does, in part, contain such subjective rights. The 
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possibility of individual complaints does not only concern civil and political rights, but also the 
economic, social, and cultural rights listed in the Convention to the extent that they allow such 
interpretation.85 As an example, the CRPD committee, in the case of Bujdosó v. Hungary stated 
that individual plaintiffs, with mental disabilities, had the right to vote.86 
Taking a very narrow understanding of the future justiciability of the Convention, the 
government, in its explanatory memorandum emphasized that the whole issue of justiciability 
had not been explicitly discussed during the treaty negotiations. In what seemed like a dialogue 
agreed upon beforehandbetween the Liberal Democrats in Parliament (who asked, “can the 
government confirm that the CRPD does not contain provisions with direct effect?”) and the 
government, the latter indicated that only the provisions that had been given direct effect 
elsewhere would have justiciability in the Convention.87 This highly restrictive interpretation of 
treaty obligations was aided by the ruling of the European Court of Justice, which has been 
criticized by legal scholars, who wrote that “[w]hile the case has been noted for drawing a 
distinction between rights and principles . . . the most significant contribution it makes is in 
demoting both.”88 It is in line, however, with earlier Dutch governmental hesitance to recognize 
the justiciability of socio-economic rights.89 It is in this light, also, one should consider the fact 
that Netherlands has not signed the Optional Protocol to the CRPD. 
The ratification of the Optional Protocol was—unlike accessibility—not a civil society or 
media concern, possibly because the issue was too technical. The issue was subject to some 
parliamentary debate, with parliamentarians wondering what held the government from ratifying 
given the fact that nearly ninety countries, including neighboring Belgium, Germany, and the UK 
had already done so. The formal governmental position was that ratification must be considered 
in relation to ratification of the protocols to the ICESCR and the CRC, both of which the 
Netherlands has signed but not ratified.90 In the debate in the Senate, the State Secretary 
indicated that it would be necessary to investigate “what this would add to the Dutch 
possibilities, what it means for administrative burden and for existing legislation.”91 He 
explained that there are treaties for which there is already enough recourse in Dutch law, and that 
the government—in these cases—does not what to create “an alternative form of legal recourse 
without understanding how this would have effect on our own system.”92 One senator pointed 
out that this seemed like “an old-fashioned game of playing for time,” an assessment that seemed 
confirmed when the government stated in June 2016 that it would get back on the issue of 
ratification of the Optional Protocol, indicating that the “necessary discussions had not yet been 
finalized,” and repeating that message in September.93 
Whereas it is much too early to assess whether Dutch judges, who have the last word in 
this matter, will allow individual persons with disabilities to call on the Convention in a concrete 
case, the legislative process set the stage for a very restrictive interpretation and, ultimately, less 
protection of the people concerned. It could well be that the relatively technical matter of the 
legal implications of ratifying the Optional Protocol for subjective rights explains why civil 
society was much more silent on this issue than on others, thus enabling the government to set 
the stage for an interpretation that differs markedly from the international standard. The NGO 
‘In1school’, that has announced strategic litigation in order to realize inclusive education, will 
thus find its case potentially hampered by this legislative history.94 
 
V. Ignoring Obligations: The Example of Inclusive Education 
The issue of justiciability was subject to extensive discussions, within Parliament and in the 
reports of the Council of the State and human rights research groups. Here, there is a marked 
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contrast with an issue that could very well have been on the table, but was not: inclusive 
education. Article 24(2) of the Convention explicitly enshrines the right to inclusive education, 
stating that State Parties shall ensure that: 
(a) Persons with disabilities are not excluded from the general education system 
on the basis of disability, and that children with disabilities are not excluded from 
free and compulsory primary education, or from secondary education, on the basis 
of disability; 
(b) Persons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality and free primary 
education and secondary education on an equal basis with others in the 
communities in which they live.95 
There is a clear contrast here with the Dutch system of segregated education, in which 5 percent 
of the Dutch pupils attend special needs schools.96 The government, however, in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the CRPD redefined inclusive as meaning “that nobody is excluded from 
education,” to continue to describe the Dutch system of regular schools and special schools for 
children living with disabilities.97 In 2009, for instance, the government informed Parliament that 
special education would continue to exist, with the State Secretary quoted as saying: “we’ve tried 
inclusive education and it was failure, so we will not discuss that again.”98 
Even more striking is the fact that the Netherlands, eight years after signing the CRPD, 
adopted a new law—the Law on Fitting Education (Wet Passend Onderwijs)—in 2014 that 
explicitly kept the old system in place.99 The purpose of the Law on Fitting Education was to 
enable more students in special education to go to regular schools. At the same time, these 
schools did not receive extra resources, something that many criticized. In spite of the direct 
relationship with Article 24(2), the Memorandum introducing the Law on Fitting Education in 
2014 did not refer to the CRPD once.100  
The theme of inclusive education was only raised in the written rounds preceding 
parliamentary discussion of the CRPD. Here, parliamentarians asked the government why it had 
not paid attention to inclusive education in the legislative proposals concerning the CRPD, 
especially in light of the CRC and the Salamanca Declaration.101 The government pointed at the 
Dutch tradition of separate regular and special education, also in the light of Dutch geography: 
“In a densely populated country like the Netherlands both regular and special education are 
within a reasonable distance. This makes is less necessary to, because of travel time, realize 
special education.”102 It also pointed at Fitting Education’s goal to support special needs students 
in attending regular education—wherever possible. The issue of inclusive education, conversely, 
was not discussed again in the plenary discussions on the CRPD in Parliament and in the 
Senate.103 Even where newspapers and parents reported concerns about the effects of the new 
legislation on access to education for children with disabilities, these were not framed in terms of 
the CRPD objectives.  
Explanations of this relative neglect of Article 24(2) of the CRPD also must include the 
fact that experts and expert organizations often did not know the CRPD or did not support the 
objective of inclusive education. When the directors of a consortia of regular and special schools 
on implementing Fitting Education (samenwerkingsverbanden) were asked about the normative 
basis for extra support 98 percent pointed at the children’s need for support, whereas only 1 
percent pointed at the principle of inclusive education.104 Out of the 59 specialist legal articles on 
the new Law on Fitting Education that appeared after 2009, for instance, none refers to the 
CRPD.105 NGOs, with the exception of the Alliance of Organizations of People with a Disability, 
did not raise the point or push it later on in the process. The ignoring of treaty obligations here, it 
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seems, took place upon the initiative of government but was strengthened by a lack of 
parliamentary, civil society, and expert endorsement of the issue at hand. 
The Law on Fitting Education is an example, but was only one out of a large package of 
measures taken by the post-2010 government that affected people living with disabilities. In this 
period, the government implemented a large-scale decentralization operation, in combination 
with severe budget cuts. The new Law on Social Support (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 
(WMO)), adopted in summer 2015, for example, not only made municipalities responsible for 
social support to the disabled, but also reduced their (individualized) budgets, making them more 
reliant on volunteer support.106 The Law on Participation (Participatiewet) made an end to social 
work facilities for the disabled, with the budget cuts concerned. The rationale was that this would 
stimulate people to take up regular jobs, and strengthen their participation in society. Both laws 
were severely criticized for their impact upon, amongst others, the disabled. These critiques, 
however, were not framed in terms of the CRPD obligations and the connection between these 
legislative proposals—passed after signing but before ratifying—and the CRPD was hardly ever 
made. It was only during the discussion on the CRPD in a right-wing politician scorned 
“[e]veryone understands that, if this treaty had been discussed first and the WMO and the other 
105 budget cuts afterwards, there would not have been such a regression in services as is 
currently the case.”107  
 
VI. Conclusion 
During a parliamentary hearing on the CRPD a representative of the mental health care 
organizations said: “You really have to take care that this Convention does not become a fruit 
bowl out of which you pick those fruits you liked anyway.”108 Even if there is more socio-
scientific literature on the politics of implementation of human rights treaties, such literature 
often concerns treaties as a homogeneous whole and starts analysis of their impact after 
ratification. By taking a close look at the period between signature and ratification of the CRPD 
in the Netherlands, this article has focuses on preratification politics, setting out how these 
politics can ensure that one treaty provision becomes more important than another. In doing so, it 
shows how even in a country generally considered one of the most monist in the world the 
process of ratification can include substantial renegotiation of the normative content of treaties. 
The interplay between actors in government, Parliament, and society at large ensures that certain 
issues are highlighted, while others are downplayed or downright ignored. These perspectives, 
formally discussed in Parliament, become part of the legislative history of the treaty, and thus – 
withing the Dutch legal system -  influence the way it will be interpreted by judges. The issues 
discussed, in contrast to those ignored,  become part of the collective consciousness of all 
stakeholders, thus ensuring that the parties involved in actually implementing a treaty will focus 
more on certain aspects than others. In the Netherlands, for instance, it is clear that the 
preratification process has put accessibility firmly on the policy agenda, whereas inclusive 
education is not closer (and possibly even further away) than it was when the Netherlands signed 
the CRPD. The governmental strategy of downplaying treaty obligations as a form of preemptive 
minimization is also notable. Whereas the actual impact of the CRPD in the Netherlands remains 
to be seen, one can see that a stage has been set in which some rights for the disabled are in much 
closer reach than others.  
These findings shed light on processes of human rights implementation far beyond this 
particular country, or the case of the CRPD alone. Even if there are marked differences between 
the processes that accompany the ratification of human rights treaties worldwide, it is expected 
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that similar politics are at play in other democracies. In other democracies, too, bills are 
accompanied by explanatory memoranda explanatory memorandum accompanies bills, in which 
the executive offers its understanding of the often wide-ranging treaty provisions and interprets 
them for domestic purposes. In other democracies, too, parliamentarians are often too busy, 
uninformed, uninterested, or preoccupied with other issues to take up the full range of issues 
addressed in a treaty, and thus inclined to focus on a number of points—be it presented to them 
as a result of political lobbying or by other means. Other democracies, too, will have some civil 
society organizations that are stronger and better equipped for advocacy than others, with each 
placing an emphasis on the issues that seem most attainable and in line with their direct interests. 
As such, the preratification phase is of crucial importance for the formal and informal 
interpretation and ultimately the implementation of treaties worldwide. 
This has a number of consequences for the—rising—field of socio-scientific research on 
human rights implementation. If the ambition is truly to understand the effects of international 
human rights law in domestic settings  one must consider, in terms of the timespan covered, 
looking at the preratification phase, instead of only starting research after formal ratification. 
Next, one should distinguish between the various treaty obligations to a much larger extent than 
is currently often the case. Finally, this case calls for comparative attention to the degree to 
which the domestic legal interpretation of treaty obligations, put forward as part of the 
ratification process, impacts the actual treaty. An old saying goes” “you never get a second 
chance to make a first impression”. This also applies to human rights treaties: the way a treaty 
first enters the domestic scene is of more importance than has been recognized to date, most 
importantly for those rights holders who stand to benefit from it most.  
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